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Abstract 
Patterns of Labour Market Exit in Germany and the UK 
Christiane Oswald 
Sonderforschungsbereich 186 
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Wiener StraßelFVG-West 
Postfach 330440 
D-28334 Bremen (Germany) 
Tel.: +49-421/218-4131 
Fax.: +49-421/218-4153 
email: coswald@sfb186.uni-bremen.de 
This study gives an overview of the pathways from work to retirement in Britain and 
Germany. Although the institutional incentives differ considerably, both countries face a 
trend towards early retirement. In Germany, this development was mostly attributed to the 
favourable conditions in the social security system. In the UK, the increasing coverage of 
occupational and private pensions seems to be responsible for the low labour force 
participation of older persons. For the duration analysis, a distinction is made between 
various exit paths from work. The results indicate that the social security or occupational 
pension schemes have a strong impact on the age a person leaves the labour force for 
retirement. Pension incentives can less explain the moves into other states of non-
employment. 
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Preface 
The purpose of this research project (led by Prof. Dr. Winfried Schmähl) is to investigate 
the transition from employment to retirement with a special focus on part-time work and 
early retirement. One aim of this study is to find out in how far social policy regulations 
influence personnel policy concerning older workers. Another aim is to give an overview 
of typical exit paths from the labour force and to test labour market theories concerning 
older workers by using longitudinal micro data. 
An aging population and a trend towards earlier retirement imply a growing number of 
elderly people dependent on a shrinking labour force. In pay-as-you-go pension schemes, 
this leads to higher social security contributions and increasing costs of labour. Govem-
ments, as a consequence, are increasingly interested in reforms that will improve incentives 
for individuals to work until a later age. At the same time, conditions for early retirement 
are getting worse. This paper provides a comparison of labour market exits in Germany, a 
country with high social security incentives with the UK, a country with low social secu-
rity incentives to retire early. It offers some insight into which factors determine the deci-
sion to retire or to exit from the labour market via unemployment or disability. 
First, a review of theoretical and empiricalliterature on retirement and labour market exits 
in the UK and in Germany is given. This is followed by an introduction to the institutional 
setting of early retirement in both countries, such as social security rules and the labour 
market situation of older workers. Event history models, based on the German Socio Eco-
nomic Panel (GSOEP) and the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), are estimated for 
men and women. Their results suggest that, institutional settings of social security and oc-
cupational pensions play a mayor role for the age of retirement. To explain the exits into 
other states of inactivity, family circumstances, individual and job characteristics also must 
be considered. 
Prof. Dr. Walter R. Heinz 
Chair, Special Collaborative Centre 186 
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1 Introduction 
Both in Germany and in the UK the employment rate among men between the ages of 55 
and 65 has fallen between the beginning of the 1970s and the mid 1990s. Labour market 
statistics indicate that fewer and fewer persons work until the statutory pension age and in 
many cases an intermediary phase of unemployment or other inactivity has emerged be-
tween the end of employment and receipt of astate pension. Persons who have been made 
redundant late in their working life often feel that there is 1ittle point in looking for another 
jo band declare themselves retired. In general, they bridge the gap between work and 
"regular" retirement by payments like unemployment benefits or sickness pay 
From a macroeconomie perspective, the shift towards early retirement results in a decline of 
the aggregate labour supply. A trend towards earlier retirement implies a loss of skills and 
experience and therefore a waste of human capital. In aging populations, it means also a 
growing number of elderly people dependent on a shrinking labour (Disney 1996, p. 198). 
The fact that persons leaving the labour force turn from contributors of taxes and social 
security into recipients of benefits is especially problematic in the German pay-as-you-go 
pension system where the active labour force has to pay the pensions for the retired 
(Schmähl 1992, p. 83). High social security contributions increase the costs of labour, 
which is partly made responsible for the high unemployment rate in Germany. Because of 
this and the expected burdens by demographie aging, the conditions for early retirement 
have recently made worse in order to encourage older people to remain in or to re-enter the 
labour market. The same has been done in the UK, although the flat rate pension scheme in 
the UK is not likely to undergo fmancial difficulties. 
There is, however, a conflict of interests between social security and labour market goals. 
As long as the unemployment rates are high or employers are not willing to hire older 
workers, the changes could lead primarily to lower replacement rates of pensions and 
eventually poverty in old age. Therefore, it is not sufticient to analyse the labour supply 
behaviour influenced by factors like labour income, social security benefits, pensions, wealth 
and preferences for leisure over work. Also labour demand factors have to be considered. 
These factors are strongly related to older workers' cost to the employer, especially in com-
parison to younger workers. A significant postponement of retirement age can only be ex-
pected if the labour market situation is favourable enough to develop a demand for older 
workers. 
A comparison of Germany with the UK, a country with lower social security incentives to 
retire early, might give some insight into whieh factors determine the exit from the labour 
market via retirement, unemployment or dis ability. One aim of this study is to outline the 
paths from work to retirement which are taken in the UK and in Germany. Another aim is to 
fmd out how far different incentives cause observable differences in the labour market be-
haviour of older workers. According to economic theory, people in the UK should work 
until a later age than in Germany and they should to a larger extent continue work after re-
tirement age. Since the analysis of incentive effects of the German social security system on 
retirement has already been done extensively, the models in this paper allow for other exit 
states than retirement and concentrate on the job and family factors that influence the labour 
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market participation in late working life. The empirical analysis is done by descriptive and 
event history analysis relying on data of worklife-histories and panel data drawn from the 
German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the British Household Panel Study (BHPS). 
2 Theoretical background and existing research on 
retirement behaviour 
Economic research on the labour force behaviour of older workers and the retirement deci-
sion has mainly been forced by demographic change and growing fmancial burdens for pen-
sion systems and social policy as a whole. Retirement is treated as an aspect of labour sup-
ply, taking into account special institutional arrangements such as public or occupational 
pension schemes. According to economic theory (see e.g. Killingsworth 1983), an individual 
is supposed to retire from the labour force if his or her lifetime utility cannot be augmented 
by postponing the exit from the labour market. 
A large part of the economic studies analysing the retirement decision in Germany focuses 
on incentives set by the social security system. Viebrok (1997) offers a theoretical dynamic 
labour supply model which describes these incentives in a detailed manner. Due to data re-
strictions and complexity, empirical investigations tend to simplify the utility maximisation 
framework and the social security incentives. To model the incentive effects of the German 
statutory pension scheme (see e.g. Antolin, Scarpetta 1998; Börsch-Supan, Schnabel, 1997 
Siddiqui 1997) approximate "option values" for early retirement were constructed and in-
cluded as covariates. These option values of postponing retirement are used to assess the 
economic incentives of public pension schemes. 
Empirical evidence for Germany is generally based on data from the German Socio Eco-
nomic Panel (see e.g. Siddiqui 1997, Schmidt 1995, Börsch-Supan, and Schnabel 1997). 
Earlier retirement is considered as a rational response to incentives by the statutory pension 
system. Besides this, poor health seems to have the strongest impact on leaving the labour 
market. Riphahn (1995), who studies the transition into disability retirement, fmds a strong 
impact of health and the degree of disability on the hazard for disability retirement, but po-
tential retirement incomes are not significant. A possible interpretation can be that disability 
pensions in Germany do not offer a strong incentive to look actively for this option or that 
criteria for eligibility are severe enough to discourage people who are only looking for a 
possibility to leave the labour market earlier. 
The institutional framework in the UK is such that retirement cannot be modelled as a well-
defmed labour market state distinct from other speIls out of work. Studies analysing the 
labour market exit in the UK, generally take this into account (see e.g. BlundeIl, Johnson 
1997 or Disney, Meghir, Whitehouse 1994) and model transitions from employment into 
non-employment and back. Most of these studies rely on data for men from the UK Retire-
ment History Survey 1988-89, one uses the BHPS (Miniaci, Stancanelli 1998). They all fmd 
that the flat rate state retirement pension systems offer no incentives to retire early. For 
those with private provision, state benefits are likely to be relatively unimportant in under-
standing retirement behaviour (BlundeIl, Johnson 1997). Rather, the rules of their occpa-
2 
tional or private pension scheme will be more important. There is a large variety of pension 
schemes which differ according to replacement rates and eligibility. 
All studies agree that with an occupational pension right, persons are more likely to with-
draw from the labour market early. A large proportion of men and women with those pen-
sions retire at the age of 55 when relatively generous benefits become available. Persons 
without an occupational pension right experience shorter job speIls and a more heterogene-
ous job exit behaviour (BlundeIl, Johnson 1997). To study the effects of earnings and po-
tential social security benefits on retirement behaviour, Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) im-
puted earnings and benefits from the UK Family Expenditure Survey and included only per-
sons without occupational pension rights in the analysis. They fmd that increased eamings at 
work delay job exit, while increased social security benefits delay the return to work. In 
conjunction, the two effects confrrm that economic incentives are important determinants of 
the retirement age. 
There has been little research on possible labour market restrictions for older workers and 
the degree how voluntary the decision to retire is. Exceptions are Riphahn and Schmidt 
(1995) who examined the question whether older workers are pushed out of their jobs by 
high unemployment or whether they are pulled into retirement by generous pensions. Esti-
mations based on time-series data provided by the German pension insurance offer no evi-
dence in favour of the "push-thesis", which is not surprising, considering the official unem-
ployment figures underestimate the effect of underemployment in the presence of early re-
tirement. 1 Riphahn (1997) studies the determinants of transitions from work into disability 
retirement and unemployment and fmds that they can not be treated as "substitute path-
ways" for early retirement. 
This might support the hypothesis that some workers are restricted in their labour supply 
choices and that disability and sickness not only affect the individual preference for leisure. 
The same might be true for people who become unemployed: It is unlikely that all early 
retirees give up work voluntarily, accept a "golden handshake" and chose early retirement 
as an option. Modelling astate of involuntary exit from the labour market empirically is 
nevertheless difficult, because of the limited information available from the datasets. 
Non economic factors influencing the timing of retirement include marital status or house-
hold size. To look at individuals without considering their family context is maybe appropri-
ate for the labour force behaviour of males or single women. Empirical evidence (Allmend-
inger 1994, O'Rand, Henretta, Krecker 1992), however, shows that the partners' status 
plays an important role for the behaviour of couples, who often favour a synchronisation of 
retirement. For married women, the family background not only has an impact on their la-
bour supply during the child rearing years but also for their labour supply at the age of re-
tirement. They tend to exit more frequently to astate of economic inactivity and family care 
(see figure 1). 
1 Apart of the unemployed over 58 are not included in the official unemployment figures, see seetion 
2.1.1. 
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To explore labour markets exits other than retirement, I have to extend the neoclassical 
labour supply theory by theories allowing for unvoluntary exits from the labour market, 
especially via unemployment. In a lack of a unique economic theory, I apply a combination 
of the Human Capital Theory and the theory of segmented labour markets (see also Aarts, 
de Jong 1992, 190ff.). According to Human Capital Theory, persons who have invested 
more in their education and training are likely to eam higher wages and to remain in the 
labour market for longer. From the labour demand side, highly skilled people are seen as 
more productive and do not only eam higher wages but also are less likely to lose their jobs. 
Segmented labour market theory considers market opportunities to be primarily determined 
by the segment of the market in which a person fmds himself. The initial concept of dual 
labour markets (Doeringer, Piore 1971) differentiates between two main segments2: jobs in 
the frrst segment offer higher wages, employment security and better career prospects 
whereas jobs in the second segment do not have all these qualities. The mobility between 
the two sectors is very low, especially persons who have been working in the secondary 
segment are not likely to get employment in the primary sector. Workers in the primary 
sector, on the other hand, are supposed to get a chance to acquire more skills and experi-
ence within the frrm. These achievements increase their productivity and their wages and 
reinforce their job security. 
Duallabour market theory pays more attention to the employer or the job and is less explicit 
on why people fmd themselves in a particular segment. Human capital theory, in compari-
son, concentrates more on personal characteristics and less on the job the person actually 
has. In respect to an involuntary exit from the labour market, the theory of segmented la-
bour markets suggests that people working in the second sector of the labour market should 
have a higher probability of becoming unemployed. Since their jobs are often considered 
dangerous or health damaging, they are also more likely to stop work because of sickness or 
disability. For the transition to retirement, it is more difficult to form a hypothesis. Workers 
in the privileged segment eam higher wages which makes them more likely to remain in the 
labour force. On the other hand, they expect better pensions and have higher assets which 
makes them less dependent on earned income and more likely to retire early. 
3 Institutional background of early retirement 
3.1 Sodal security legislation and pension incentives to retire early 
3.1.1 Early retirement in Germany 
The German statutory pension scheme is a mandatory pay-as-you-go public pension insur-
ance for all workers. Permanent civil servants and certain groups of self-employed, who are 
covered by their own pension systems are exempt. It is mainly contribution-based and sup-
plemented by federal grants. Private pensions and company pensions are only of minor im-
2 This simple segmentation model has been extended for Germany to a tripartite labour market differen-
ciating between unstructured, professional and internallabour markets (Sengenberger 1987). 
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portance, the latter are concentrated in the public sector and with large employers in special 
sectors. The public pension system is designed to maintain the standard of living after re-
tirement. Benefits depend on the average relative earnings of all insured and the number of 
individual contribution years. They are adjusted regularly to the net average earnings of all 
employees. For the so-called "standard pensioner,,3 replacement rates aim at 70 per cent of 
former net eamings. There are also benefits for surviving spouses and children. Besides old 
age pensions, pension insurance provides disability pensions without age limits. The share of 
dis ability pensions in the German pension system is relatively important: in 1993, 30 per 
cent of all new male pensioners claimed disability benefits. 
The normal retirement age in Germany has been 65 for men and women, but until recently, 
there several possibilities allowed to claim an unreduced old age pension before this age. 
Persons with long insurance records (35 years or more) could retire at the age of 63; 
wornen with insurance records of 10 years within the last twenty years, unernployed with an 
unemployment duration of at least one year or disabled or chronically ill persons could retire 
at the age of 60. As pensions were not reduced for retiring early, only few people worked 
until the age of 65, in 1994 only 13.6 per cent of men and 5.5 per cent of women (Mikro-
zensus 1994). In 1992 and 1996, two major reforms changed the conditions of claiming an 
old age pension: Regular retirement age has been raised to 65 for everybody except for siek 
and disabled persons. 4 
Several studies show that, even after these reforms, the German public pension system is 
not age neutral. The system is critised for setting strong incentives to retire earlier, because 
persons who postpone their retirement subsidise the persons who retire as early as possible 
(see e.g. Siddiqui 1997, Viebrok 1997, Börsch-Supan, Schnabel 1997). 
A large proportion of persons stops working even before the age of 60. They normally rely 
on one of the following benefits: 
• General disability benefits and occupational disability benefits have no age limits but re-
quire that a person has contributed to the pension insurance for at least five years. The 
acceptance not only depends on health but also on the labour market opportunities of a 
person with health impairments (Riphahn 1997). 
• From 1984 until 1988, there was a public pre-retirement scheme fmanced by the former 
employers and supplernented by the Federal Labour Office up to 70 per cent of former 
net eamings until the age of 60. 
• The most frequent early retirement path was the use of extended periods of unemploy-
rnent benefit combined with the possibility of early retirement at the age of 60 for long-
3 The standard pensioner according to the German pension system is a person who has earned the average 
wage for 45 years. 
4 In the course of these reforms, it is possible to draw state pensions from the age of 62 instead of 65, but 
actuarial reductions of the pension of 3.6 per cent per year have to be accepted. For an overview over the 
pension reforrns see Schmähl (1992, 1998). 
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term unemployed.5 Older employees agreed to contracts of voluntary redundancy at the 
age of 59 or earlier and became unemployed. In exchange, their unemployment benefits 
were supplemented by the employer. These redundancy payments were not statutory and 
varied across industries and according to company size. In large chemical and automobile 
companies they often reached approximately 90 per cent for the period until pension, but 
in other sectors replacement rates were lower . 
• Company-based early retirement schemes were onIy popular in the insurance and banking 
sector until the beginning of the 1990s and offered benefits paid by the former employers 
and reached replacement rates up to 100 per cent of former net earnings until eligibility 
for old age pension (Schmäh!, Gatter 1994). 
Reforms of the unempIoyment legislation since the mid 1990s make early retirement Iess 
attractive: employers, under certain conditions, have to refund the Federal Labour Office for 
paid out unemployment benefits. Unemployment benefits can be suspended, if voluntary 
redundancy is practised. The new law of "Part-Time Work in Old Age" seems to be the 
successor of the former regulations. This law provides the option of consolidating the part-
time work period before early retirement into aperiod of full time work over two and a half 
years and is used de facta as earIy retirement. 
3.1.2 Early retirement in the UK 
The United Kingdom operates a two-tier pension system. The frrst tier consists of a basic 
flat rate social security pension which is payable to everyone with a complete record of 
contributions. If a man has made contributions for Iess than 44 years and a women Iess than 
39 contribution years, the pension is reduced 6. 
The second tier is the State Eamings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) which provides an 
additional pension based on a person's lifetime earnings. Employers operating an approved 
occupational pension scheme are allowed to contract out of the state scheme. Since 1988, 
individuals making sufficient contributions to a personal pension plan are also allowed to 
opt out of the state scheme. Also since 1988, it has been possible to contract out of SERPS 
into money purchase (defmed contribution) schemes. 
The earliest statutory pension age for men is 65, for women it has been 60, but will be 
changed gradually to 65 until 2020. In 1993, the replacement ratio of the basic and addi-
tional pensions combined, as a percentage of eamings, was 33 per cent for a person with 
average eamings. About 30 per cent of the UK workforce are only members of the state 
pension scheme (basic and SERPS); 20 per cent are in the state scheme and have a private 
pension; 48 per cent are members of company schemes (the majority of them have opted 
out of SERPS and some mayaIso have a personal pension) (Taylor, Walker 1996). 
5 From the age of 58 on, unemployed persons do not have to look actively for work to get unemployment 
benefit. These unemployed workers are not included in the official unemployment figures. 
6 Dilnot et al. (1994: 14 ff.) give an overview over the various state pension schemes in Britain. 
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'. 
During the recessions of the mid 1970s and early 1980s, when the UK experienced simulta-
neous contraction of full-time employment and historie high points in the numbers of young 
people entering the labour market, youth unemployment was given a high priority by gov-
ernment and older people were actively encouraged to take early retirement. This was pos-
sible through the following options which promoted an early withdrawal from the labour 
force (Laczko, Phillipson, 1991, p. 46 ff.): 
• During the 1970s and the 1980s, govemment operated public schemes to promote 
worker deployment or replacement such as the Job Release Scheme and the Redundancy 
Payments Act. The Job Release Allowance was not eamings related, but paid at a flat 
rate. This explains in part why participation in the scheme was low and why the over-
whelming majority of recipients were low-paid semiskilled and unskilled workers force 
(Laczko, Phillipson, 1991, p. 50). 
• Unemployed men aged 60 and over who have been out of work for over a year and who 
are entitled to supplementary benefit (now called Income Support) have been able to 
claim the long-term rate of supplementary benefit and no longer have to register as un-
employed. Thus, although these older men appear in the official UK unemployment fig-
ures, they regard themselves as being siek, disabled or retired rather than unemployed. 
• In the UK labour market opportunities are not explicitly taken into consideration when 
disability benefit is awarded to older workers. But judgements of doctors for the relevant 
medical certificate "incapable of working" vary according to the labour market situation. 
• The growth of the labour force is covered by occupational and private pension schemes 
which offer fmancial provision for early retirement and higher replacement rates than the 
public pension provision. Coverage is greater in the public sector in comparison with the 
private sector and there are important class and gender divisions. 
The expansion of the economy in the late 1980s, coupled with the so-called "demographie 
timebomb" (Taylor, Walker 1996, p. 99) of falling numbers of young labour market en-
trants, let the govemment to introduce several measures aimed at encouraging older people 
to remain in or to re-enter the labour market. These include the abolition of the earnings 
rule for state pensions in 1989, which penalised people who worked beyond the state pen-
sion age eaming more than f75 a week. Furthermore, in most cases, the pension ages of 
men and women have been equalised at 65. 
As can be seen, there are important differences in the institutional factors determining the 
retirement decision in Germany and the UK. If UK pensioners have to rely solelyon public 
pensions, theyare in general worse off than pensioners in Germany. Private pensions par-
tially compensate for this gap, but it seems that more income inequality results from private 
pension provision which lacks the redistributive elements of a statutory pension system like 
in Germany. Whereas in Germany, only around 3 % of all persons in pension age claim 
means-tested benefits (Bundesministerium für Sozialordnung 1998 p. 91), in Britain, this is 
the case for almost a third of all pensioners. For the "richer" pensioners in the UK, social 
security incomes contribute less than 50 per cent to their total incomes (Johnson, Disney, 
Stears 1996 p. 16). 
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3.2 Labour relations and the labour market situation of older workers 
Labour demand factors are strongly related to older workers' cost to the employer, espe-
cially in comparison to younger workers. To protect older workers from being ftred, in 
Germany as weIl as in the UK, theyare covered by expanded protection against dismissals 
by labour law, collective or company agreements 7 . In case of staff reductions, seniority pre-
vents them from being chosen for redundancy. Nevertheless, "socially acceptable" 
workforce reduction normally means early retirement via "voluntary redundancy". Employ-
ers who do not want to lose their good reputation or do not want to risk to being taken to 
court because of unfair dismissal will offer a severance payment to persuade older workers 
to quit their jobs on their own behalf. This can be interpreted as a "trade with protection 
rights" of the older workers (Hartmann 1992). 
An important reason for the use of early retirement instead of "last in, ftrst out" policies is 
that it is less conflict-ridden than redundancies of younger workers. Individuals at the end of 
their working lives have the option of the "alternative role of early retiree" (Laczko, Phillip-
son 1991, OECD 1995). This role is related with fewer fmancial responsibilities and access 
to more generous compensation payments or income replacement beneftts than their 
younger colleagues (OECD 1995). Older workers often approve of such measures, but the 
attractiveness of early retirement pro grams strongly depends on the level of the related non-
labour income consisting of public transfers, pension beneftts and redundancy payments. 
There fo re , the main subject of negotiations between employers and trade unions (and in 
Germany, works councils) is less the question whether to use early retirement or not but the 
fmancial conditions of these pro grams. 
A study by Casey and Wood (1994) shows that in the UK voluntary redundancy and par-
ticularly early retirement have been used especially in large organizations, in organizations 
with strong trade union presence, in manufacturing and in the public sector. By contrast, in 
small frrms, in service sector organizations, in the private sector, and in organizations with 
little or no trade union presence, compulsory redundancies were practised more frequently. 
Employers have to pay statutory redundancy payments if they make workers redundant, (as 
opposed to dismissal). These payments depend on the number of years in employment and 
can reach up to 30 weeks pay for 20 years of service. The severance payments normally rise 
when voluntary redundancy agreements are made reaching up to four times the statutory 
provision (Bercusson 1993, p. 313). However, a survey of British employers in 1992 (Spils-
bury, McIntosh, Banerji 1993) fmds that 60 per cent of employers only provided the statu-
tory minimum. The exact amounts of lump sum redundancy payments are normally treated 
as conftdential and are not accessible to researchers in panel data sets. 
In Germany, the redundancy payments are often conceived in a way that they offer compen-
sation up to a certain percentage for the income loss after the exit from work until the pay-
me nt of pensions (Brühl 1997). These protection measures and regulations, which safeguard 
older workers employment status in the company, make older workers less attractive to 
7 In Germany works councils at the company level playa very importaIlt role concerning staff reductions 
and labour relations within a firm (Frick, Backes-Gellner,Sadowski 1995). 
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potential employers. Therefore, when older workers become unemployed, they have a dis-
advantaged position in fmding a new job compared to younger workers. Beside the lack of 
flexibility caused by labour law, seniority payment schemes and qualification requirements 
offer further explanations for the unfavourable labour market situation of older people. 
Lazear (1979) explains mandatory retirement as a consequence of deferred compensation 
schemes. Since the workers' productivity does not necessarily rise with their payment, older 
workers can become more costly to the employer than their younger collegues. Taylor and 
Walker (1996) asked British employers which factors might discourage them from recruit-
ing older people. The overwhelming factor discouraging recruitment and employment of 
older workers in the eyes of employers was a lack of appropriate skills. Formal qualification 
is better among younger workers and in times Qf quick technological change, work experi-
ence is not as valuable as it used to be. Many employers have become discouraged to train 
older workers by shorter payback periods. In addition, almost half of the respondents 
thought that occupational pension schemes rules acted to discourage the employment of 
older people. 
4 Own findings based on the GSOEP and the BHPS 
4.1 DescIiptive analysis of labour market exit 
With the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) and the German Socio Economic Panel 
(GSOEP) broadly comparable longitudinal datasets are available for the UK and for Ger-
many. In the descriptive analysis of modes of exit, I use event history data on retrospective 
biographical information from the individual work-life histories.8 
As mentioned earlier, the status of "retirement" is difficult to defme using household panel 
datasets. In the UK, the flat rate state pensions are not available before the age of 65 for 
men and 60 for women9 and they only provide a small part of the total retirement income in 
any case. In Germany, as there are several retirement ages, a person could be described as 
retired when he or she is receiving benefits from the statutory pension scheme. In both 
countries, however, many people declare themselves as retired before they qualify for state 
pensions. One can suppose that these people will not actively look for a job, either because 
it is in accordance with their preferences not to work or because they are too discouraged 
to look for a job. Casey and Laczko (1989) show that there is a discrepancy between benefit 
status and labour market status. Therefore, it might be useful to rely on self assessment 
when defming the labour force status offering also a comparable base for the different 
working states in the UK and in Germany.l0 
8 The Gennan sampie only includes households of the GSOEP A and B sampie; East Gennan households 
and households of the immigrant sampie are omitted. The Gennan dataset for descriptive analysis con-
sists of biographical information from the GSOEP "BIOSCOPE" (Ernicke 1997), the British dataset of 
the combined retrospective worklife history files (Halpin 1997). Thanks to Nikolei Steinhage for the 
permission to use his T ACOS programme for the correction of speIls. 
9 Womens' retirement age will have been raised to 65 by the year 2010. 
10 For other alternatives see the references mentioned in section 2. 
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The sampIe includes men and women who were working at the beginning of the sampling 
period. They are 50 and are observed until the age of 65 for Germany and 70 for the UK. 
The spelllength under consideration is the duration from the age of 50 until the exit from 
the labour market. The origin state is always astate of "working", either part-time or full 
time, self-employed or employed. The destination state is a status of economic inactivity. 
Individuals who do not stop working within the sampling period or continue working after 
the age of 65 (70 for the UK) are treated as right censored. 
Unlike temporary breaks in an individual's work career, the retirement decision is usually 
assumed to be irreversible and duration analysis regards it as an absorbing state. However, 
according to the data used and because of the possibility of earlier exit into unemployment, 
this assumption is not true. Around 6% of the German sampIe and 9% of the British sampIe 
go back at least once from economic inactivity into work after the age of 50. Most of them 
(around 50% of those re-entering the workforce) come back to work after aspeIl of unem-
ployment. In the UK, changes from a status of retirement are more common than in Ger-
many. One possible explanation for this behaviour might be the possibility of drawing a full 
occupational pension to gether with labour income as long as the pensioner changes the em-
ployer. Another reason might lie in the low replacement rates of state pensions in the UK 
which make earned income at pension age necessary. On the labour demand side, the British 
labour market is assumed to be more flexible causing employers to be less reluctant to hire 
older workers than in Germany. 
In the subsequent analysis, the sampIe only includes individuals until their ftrst observed exit 
from the labour market into astate of "not working". This is a strong simpliftcation, because 
re-entries into work and several exits out of work after the age of 50 are neglected. The 
alternative of choosing the last exit from astate of work into inactivity could also be mis-
leading, because jobs that start after the age of 50 can to a large extent considered to be 
"bridge jobs". These jobs help to fmance the time between the end of the main job until oc-
cupational or state pensions are paid. Theyare often less qualifted than career jobs and on a 
part-time basis. I am interested in the occupational background of the persons in the sampIe 
and therefore concentrate in "lifetime career jobs" and their influence on exit behaviour. 
Including speIls that end after 1975 and before 1994 (Germany) or 1995 (UK) , around 
2,000 individuallabour market speIls for each country are available after this selection. Un-
fortunately, the German data are truncated at the age of 65. Different models are estimated 
for men and women. Retirement ages both in Germany and the United Kingdom have been 
different in the sampling period and women exit into other states out of the labour force 
than men (e.g. family care instead of unemployment or disability). 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the labour market transitions for uncensored speIls that end 
after the age of 50 in the worklife-history sampIes used. Retirement is the most frequent 
form of exit. 21 % of German men exit into astate of unemployment in comparison with 
301 % of British males. Women of both countries exit to a considerable extent into the re-
sidual category "family care or disabled" . 
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Figure 1: How do spells of workers over 50 end? 
1000 -,----------------, 
Non-parametric duration analysis using Kaplan-Meier estimates can give a ftrst impression 
of the survival functions in work of older workers in both countries. The survival curves in 
ftgure 2 differentiate between the labour market states after transition into non-employment. 
BasicaIly, the results of the earlier mentioned studies can be confmned: statutory retirement 
ages are important determinants of the exit from the labour force. This is not surprising for 
Germany, where pensions from social security form by far the most important part of in-
comes in old age for both men and women. For men, the survival rates for those persons 
exiting to retirement drop at 60 and 63. For British males, occupational pensions have a 
much higher impact on retirement behaviour, but their age limits seem to be similar to those 
in the statutory pension scheme in Germany. Women are covered to a smaller extent by 
occupational and personal pension schemes than men. In both countries most of them retire 
at 60, the earliest age, when they can draw astate pension. Persons who leave the labour 
force before the statutory retirement ages exit to a large extent to unemployment or other 
labour market states. These include siek or disabled persons as weIl as persons (especially 
women) who stop work because of family duties. 
11 
Figure 2: Survival functions in work with different destination states: 
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Figure 3 displays survival pro babilities in work for several age cohorts. Y ounger cohorts 
tend to leave the labour market earlier than the older cohorts in the sampIe. For British 
males, the importance of the statutory retirement age of 65 has lost much of its importance 
for younger cohorts, similar for German males. For women in both countries, the retirement 
at the age of 60 becomes more popular for birth cohorts after 1910. For Germany, this can 
be explained by the rising labour force participation of women which makes more of the 
younger female cohorts eligible for the - early - old age pension for women. For the UK, it 
seems that womens' own pension rights seem to gain more importance for younger cohorts. 
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Figure 3: Survival functions in work for different birth cohorts 
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The use of retrospective data and descriptive analysis is weIl suited to give an idea of effects 
of demographie variables, social security regulations and reforms for different age cohorts. 
Still, in order to include time-variant covariates like job characteristics, family context or 
health status, the multinomiallogit models in the next section use current information from 
the panel data sets. 
4.2 Multinomiallogit models of labour market exit 
In addition to pure economic variables such as wages and potential pension benefits, in us-
ing hazard rate models to describe the labour market exit a number of other factors can be 
considered, inc1uding job characteristics, the individual health status and the family circum-
stances. Moreover, the duration model approach permits the updating of information as the 
individual ages (Antolin, Scarpetta 1998, p. 6). 
I use multinomiallogit models as approximations for discrete time hazard rate models with 
different destination states. Discrete time analysis seems more appropriate because most of 
the variables from the panel data are only available on a yearly basis, which is a fairly large 
time interval. Moreover, statutory retirement ages and the tendency to retire as early as pos-
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sible make many people retire at the same age. These "ties" (see e.g.Yamaguchi 1991, p. 
16) can cause problems when methods of continuous event history modelling are applied. I 
organise the data into person-period flIes because they offer an easy way to include time 
variant covariates from the panel datasets. The time dependence of the hazard rate is esti-
mated using age dummies. This makes the model equivalent to a piecewise constant expo-
nential model (see e.g. Blossfeld, Rohwer 1995, p. 114). 
Using panel data instead of the retrospective worklife history flIes leads to a trade-off as 
only those speIls which end in the sampling periods can be considered. BHPS data is avail-
able for the years from 1991 until 1997 and GSOEP data for the years from 1984 until 
1997. The sampIe includes individuals in a status of work from the age of 50 (or the frrst 
appearance in the sampIe ) until the age of 68 and is restricted to persons who are working 
at the beginning of the period under consideration. As in the Kaplan-Meier estimations, dif-
ferent models are estimated for men and women. 
As in the descriptive analysis, the self-assessed labour status market serves as dependent 
variable. I use the information given at the time of the interview. This allows for a better 
synchronisation with the independent variables. The BHPS data offer a special status for 
"disabled" or "long term siek" or "family care", which is not available for the German sam-
pIe. For Germany, I only consider two possible non-working states: "unemployed" and "re-
tired or out of the labour force". For the British data, I have three different destination 
states: "retired", "unemployed" and "other" including dis ability, siek and family care. 
The models were estimated on two sampIes for both countries. The frrst sampIe includes all 
workers except workers in farming and forestry. The second sampIe also drops self-
employed and civil servants (only Germany).l1 The short period of observation for the Brit-
ish sampIe and a relatively small number of cases only allow for a limited number of covari-
ates. In order to take into account the time dependence of the transition into non-
employment, I include dummy variables for 5 age categories. The other covariates help to 
test the hypotheses derived from human capital theory and the theory of duallabour markets 
as weIl as the hypothesis of the joint retirement of spouses. Table Al in the appendix gives 
an overview of the covariates and their means. 
11 Since the results of the employees do not differ much from the results of the larger sampies, they are 
placed in the appendix (see table A2 Germany, table A3 for the UK). 
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Table 1: Results of multinomial regression models, German sampie 
S 1 I' 1 If amp.e : mc, se empJoye d d' 'I 1 d' k 'L an CIVI servants exc u m~ wor ers m armmg an d CI estry) orr 
Women Unemployed 
Coef. Std. Err. 
Age 50-54 -0.413 0.291 
Age 55-57 0.331 0.274 
Age 58-59 
Age 60-62 
Self employed 
Ci vil servan t 
Job tenure 10 years or more -0.421 0.224 * 
Job in a large firm 0.604 0.321 * 
Job in a small firm 0.636 0.280 ** 
Job in service sector -0.985 0.217 *** 
Disabled -0.275 0.475 
Academic degree -0.721 0.740 
No job qualification -0.418 0.228 * 
Not of German nationality 0.322 0.262 
Serious health problems 0.742 0.216 *** 
Partner is working -0.260 0.245 
Lives with Partner 0.252 0.286 
Part time job 0.041 0.236 
constant -3.136 0.453 *** 
Number of events 104 
= -1351.855 Log Likelihood 
Number of obs 
X2(32) 
PseudoR2 
= 3684 (765 individuals) 
= 440.87 
= 0.1402 
Men Unemployed 
Coef. Std. Err. 
Age 50-54 0.491 0.725 
Age 55-57 1.437 0.720 ** 
Age 58-59 1.876 0.724 *** 
Age 60-62 1.869 0.729 *** 
Self empIoyed 
Civil servant 
Job tenure 10 years or more -0.459 0.157 *** 
Job in a Iarge firm 0.523 0.163 *** 
Job in a small firm 0.091 0.158 
Job in service sector -1.135 0.174 *** 
Disabled 0.307 0.200 
Academic degree -0.357 0.258 
No job qualification 0.074 0.157 
Not of German nationality 0.255 0.153 * 
Serious health problems 0.409 0.148 *** 
Partner is working -0.105 0.134 
Lives with Partner -0.049 0.201 
constant -4.150 0.753 *** 
Number of events 280 
= -2578.268 Log Likelihood 
Number of obs 
X2(32) 
= 8198 (1547 individuals) 
= 1082.79 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1735 (*, **. ***: significant at 10. 5,1 percent. respectively) 
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Retired or other states 
Coef. Std. Err. 
-2.248 0.293 *** 
-2.090 0.298 *** 
-1.213 0.296 *** 
0.469 0.281 * 
-0.081 0.208 
-0.169 0.413 
0.059 0.157 
0.176 0.184 
-0.049 0.154 
-0.117 0.144 
0.601 0.206 *** 
-0.304 0.331 
0.285 0.139 ** 
-0.443 0.191 ** 
0.785 0.144 *** 
-0.349 0.152 ** 
0.363 0.170 ** 
0.670 0.139 *** 
-1.479 0.364 *** 
330 
Retired or other states 
Coef. Std. Err. 
-4.184 0.199 *** 
-3.327 0.178 *** 
-2.353 0.172 *** 
-1.356 0.155 *** 
-0.623 0.179 *** 
0.644 0.178 *** 
-0.257 0.150 * 
0.285 0.135 ** 
-0.055 0.126 
0.020 0.117 
1.048 0.133 *** 
-1.001 0.180 *** 
0.020 0.143 
-0.239 0.148 
0.840 0.115 *** 
-0.268 0.112 ** 
0.210 0.178 
-0.249 0.256 
513 
Table 2: Results of multinomial regression models, British sampie 
S I I' I d' lf amp.e : mc u mg se empJoye d ( I d' , f exc u mg workers m armmgan dtl orrestry, 
Women Unemployed 
Coef, Std. Err. 
Age 50-54 0.975 0.475 ** 
Age 55-57 0.848 0.508 * 
Age 58-59 
Age 60-62 
Self employed -0.799 0.755 
Occupational pension right -0.814 0.423 * 
Job with fixed term contract 0.728 0.634 
part time job -0.394 0.379 
Academic degree 
Serious health problems 0,609 0.749 
Partner is working 0.320 0.511 
Lives with Partner -0.123 0.619 
constant -4.297 0.595 *** 
Number of events 33 
Log Likelihood = -893.554 
Number of obs 
X2(33) 
= 
= 
2041 (567 individuals) 
269.87 
PseudoR2 = 0.1312 
Men Unemployed 
Coef. Std. Err. 
Age 50-54 0.609 0.399 
Age 55-57 -0.163 0.454 
Age 58-59 -0.227 0.520 
Age 60-62 0.420 0.443 
Self employed -1.363 0.356 *** 
Occupational pension right -0.793 0.268 *** 
Job with fixed term contract 0.820 0.376 ** 
Job tenure 10 years or more -0.077 0.256 
Academic degree -0.816 0.474 * 
Serious health problems 0.012 0.741 
Partner is working -0.143 0.274 
Lives with Partner -0.001 0.388 
constant -2.741 0.475 *** 
Number of events 77 
Log Ltkehhood 
Number of obs 
X2(36) 
= -991.000 
Pseudo R2 
= 2480 (698 individuals) 
= 365.25 
= 0.1556 
Retired 
Coef. Std. Err. 
-2.723 0.355 *** 
-2.267 0.324 *** 
-1.433 0.297 *** 
-0.151 0.209 
-0.112 0.290 
0.453 0.201 ** 
0.623 0.267 ** 
0.022 0.194 
0.187 0.262 
0.664 0.393 * 
-0.512 0.207 ** 
0.033 0.222 
-1.320 0.266 *** 
167 
Retired 
Coef. Std. Err. 
-3.550 0.389 *** 
-2.501 0.278 *** 
-2.354 0.322 *** 
-1.543 0.241 *** 
-0.980 0.275 *** 
0.451 0.218 ** 
0.820 0.286 *** 
0.305 0.190 
-0.083 0.258 
1.792 0.377 *** 
-0.425 0.193 ** 
-0.002 0.270 
-1.076 0.297 *** 
164 
Other states 
Coef. Std. Err. 
0.737 0.429 * 
0.514 0.449 
0.227 0.514 
-0.468 0.576 
0.766 0.349 ** 
-0.056 0.324 
1.607 0.337 *** 
0.914 0.315 *** 
-1.069 0.544 ** 
1.406 0.425 *** 
-0.534 0.304 * 
0.904 0.440 ** 
-5.025 0.586 *** 
66 
Other states 
Coef. Std. Brr. 
-0.832 0.618 
0.035 0.550 
0.262 0.576 
0.392 0.558 
-0.473 0.464 
-0.085 0.386 
-0.928 1.034 
0.217 0.312 
-1.309 0.740 * 
2.819 0.366 *** 
-0.635 0.325 ** 
0.380 0.521 
-3.870 0.692 *** 
48 
Potential benefits of the German statutory pension scheme mainly depend on the lifetime 
average income position and on years of service. I control for these economic effects by age 
dummies and human capital variables. In preliminary analysis, observed information on la-
bour income had a small negative effect on the probability to retire. The construction of 
potential benefits would be even more complicated for the UK because of the variety of 
different public, occupational and private pensions. Personal pensions, life insurances and 
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wealth are not included, rather I include time invariant dummy variable indicating whether 
the person has an occupational pension right. This variable takes into account that - in gen-
eral - occupational pension schemes are more generous than the additional state pension 
(SERPS) and can be drawn at a younger age than the state pensions (Meghir, Whitehouse 
1997). 
Workers with an occupational pension right are more likely to retire, although the effect is 
not significant for employed men (see Table 2). This variable also seems to offer a useful 
test for a hypo thesis derived from dual labour market theory: persons with an occupational 
pension tend to belong to the favourable segment of the labour market and they are less 
likely to become unemployed. Although the link between an occupational pension right and 
a "good" job may have changed with the increased introduction of personal pensions since 
the late 1980s, this is still true for the co horts in this sampIe. 
In Germany (see Table 1), self-employed and civil servants are to a large extent covered by 
special or private pension arrangements. Civil servants in Germany are almost without ex-
ception not subject to unemployment yet they see m to make earlier exits into retirement 
than normal employees. Their pension incomes are very generous and special pre-tirement 
programs and more generous rules regarding dis ability pensions are in operation. Self-
employed in both countries tend to remain longer in the labour market. One possible expla-
nation would be that they are more content with their work and cannot be laid off by their 
employers or forced into early retirement programs. Self employed, however, are a heter-
ogenous group. Apart of them also remain longer in the labour market, because they do not 
have collected enough pension claims to afford early retirement. 12 
Human capital theory suggests that highly qualified people stay longer in the labour market 
because they have a longer payback period on their investments into human capital. Hefe, 
they do not have an important impact on the job exit behaviour. For German men, only an 
academic degree provides an effect in favour of a postponement of retirement. German 
women without a job qualification tend to retire earlier but seem to become less often un-
employed than women with an occupational qualification, which is surprising as it contra-
dicts human capital theory. For the British sampIe, an academic degree reduces the prob-
ability of entering astate of unemployment, disability or family care. 
Job characteristics are included to represent the impact of labour demand on the exit from 
work. I aggregated industrial sectors to rather coarse categories and omitted workers in 
farming and forestry. In Germany, workers in the service sector have a lower probability of 
becoming unemployed than workers in the manufacturing and energy sector. During the 
period under consideration, the manufacturing sectors experienced a major restructuring 
and a decline of employment whereas the service sector grew. This may have changed re-
cently, when e.g. German banks started to reduce their staff just as the manufacturing sec-
12 For Germany, self employed claimants of full and partial pensions in 1995 often mentioned "lack of 
money" when they were asked, why they would not take early retirement (George, Oswald 1997). 
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tors did in the 1980s and early 1990s. For the British sampIe of employees (see Table A3), 
this effect is much weaker. 13 
In Germany, men and women working in large frrms are more likely to become unemployed 
than workers in medium-sized frrms. Large frrms often expanded significantly during the 
sixties and seventies and now suff er from unfavourable age structures. They also have the 
fmancial means to pay high redundancy payments and thereby make their employees agree 
to voluntary redundancy. Strikingly, women working in small frrms are also more likely to 
become unemployed. This might be due to labour law: in small frrms, protection against 
dismissal is less strict. 
Manyemployers seem to practice "last in frrst out" policies. When staff is reduced, older 
workers with a long tenure normally profit from better protection from dismissal than their 
newly hired colleagues. In Germany, a tenure for 10 years or more in the same job seems to 
be a kind of insurance against unemployment, but those persons also seem to retire later. In 
the UK, a long work tenure only has a significant effect in the sampIe of employees (Table 
A3). Not surprisingly, in Britain, workers with a fIXed term contract are more likely to enter 
retirement or unemployment. 14 
Since there are very few male part-time workers in career jobs, the variable is only included 
for women. It has a significant effect towards an early exit into retirement or family care in 
Germany and an effect on the exit into family care for the UK. This could support the hy-
pothesis that part-time working women are less inclined to work than female full-time 
workers. 
Looking at the non-job characteristics, health and disability (Germany) seem to have a very 
high influence on the labour force behaviour. Disabled people exiting the labour market 
earlier than others is not surprising since disability pensions can only be claimed if a person 
is severely disabled or chronically ill. In Germany, the subjective health satisfaction aug-
ments the risk of unemployment and retirement significantly; in Britain, it has a strong effect 
only on the probability to retire or to exit into disability or family care. Nevertheless, it has 
to be kept in mind that the self-reported health satisfaction may be biased in the sense that 
people who want to stop their work report worse health because they want to justify their 
withdrawal from the labour market. 
Household characteristics like household size and household income did not have significant 
effects and were excluded from the estimations. Therefore, family relationships concentrate 
on the partnership status of the individual. Married or cohabiting people are assumed to 
have a higher preference for leisure and therefore a higher probability of retiring early. Only 
for women, some evidence can be found in favour of this hypothesis. Another hypothesis 
suggests, that couples want to synchronise their retirement. This can be is confrrmed by the 
estimation results, because the trend towards early retirement is reversed, if the partner is 
13 When I distinguished between different parts of the service sector, ernployees of the state, education or 
the health sector on average tend to retire earlier. This variation cannot to be found in the tables in the 
appendix. 
14 The tenure variable was not included for wornen because of the srnall sample size. 
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still working. This is the case for men as weIl as for women and is in accordance with the 
fmdings of Allmendinger (1994). 
5 Summary and Outlook 
This paper offers a comparative analysis of early retirement patterns for Germany and the 
UK using panel and retrospective worklife history data. The retrospective data allows a 
comparison of the job exit behaviour of various birth cohorts. In both countries, younger 
cohorts tend to leave the labour market earlier than older cohorts. The survival curves also 
emphasise the strong impact of statutory pension ages for retirement exits in Germany as 
weIl as in Britain indicating that most individuals retire as soon as they can claim a pension. 
In Britain, however, returns to gainful work after a late period of unemployment and even 
retirement are more common than in Germany. These "bridge jobs" are often on apart-time 
basis or self-employed. 
The results of the multinomiallogit models provide similar estimations for both countries. In 
the UK, occupational pension rights play an important role in early retirement and can be 
used as indicators for jobs in the frrst labour market. Health-related factors seem to playa 
major role for all exit routes, family circumstances escpecially influence womens' retirement 
process. The estimations show that the factors influencing the exit into retirement are much 
different from the factors that influence the exit into unemployment in both countries. While 
pensions play an important role for the retirement process, labour demand factors mainly 
influence the exit into unemployment or other states of work. 
These differences should be accounted for when a prolongation of working life is discussed. 
If it is true that some of the older workers make an involuntary exit from the labour market, 
it is not sufficient to set financial incentives to work longer. Improving health and working 
conditions, on the one hand, is necessary to keep the older workers "able for work". On the 
other hand, the demand for older workers can only be raised if they are not too costly for 
the employers and if their qualifications are up-to-date. 
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Appendix 
Table Al: Means of Covariates 
Ge . I d' If I ed d"1 rmany: mc u mg se empJO an CIVI servants 
Women Men 
Status in next speIl: Working Unemployed Inactive* Working Unemployed In active * 
Age categories 
Age50-54 0.493 0.365 0.224 0.452 0.229 0.092 
Age 55-57 0.294 0.433 0.170 0.291 0.371 0.146 
Age 58-59 0.131 0.173 0.182 0.129 0.236 0.185 
Age 60-62 0.060 0.019 0.352 0.097 0.157 0.320 
Age 63-68 reference category reference category 
Job characteristics 
Self employed 0.104 0.010 0.133 0.120 0.014 0.113 
Civil servant 0.036 0.019 0.030 0.099 0.011 0.144 
Job tenure 10 years or more 0.729 0.654 0.788 0.830 0.779 0.864 
J ob in a large firm 0.220 0.231 0.221 0.303 0.346 0.341 
Job in medium sized firm reference category reference category 
(201-2000 workers) 
J ob in a small firm 0.511 0.596 0.512 0.401 0.396 0.388 
J ob in service sector 0.679 0.442 0.694 0.371 0.157 0.444 
Part-time job 0.348 0.317 0.464 0.005 0.004 0.045 
Highest educ. attainment 
Acadernic degree 0.054 0.019 0.055 0.129 0.064 0.105 
Vocational training reference category reference category 
No job qualification 0.511 0.490 0.545 0.258 0.336 0.222 
Demographies 
Not of German nationality 0.219 0.317 0.161 0.280 0.389 0.212 
Serious health problems 0.194 0.365 0.306 0.161 0.239 0.310 
Disabled 0.059 0.048 0.130 0.076 0.114 0.224 
Partner is working 0.493 0.471 0.382 0.440 0.379 0.316 
Lives with Partner 0.717 0.760 0.733 0.898 0.879 0.906 
* including retired, family care and disabled 
UK' I d' : mc u mg se If empJoye d 
Women Men 
Status in next speIl: Working Unempl. Retired Other* Working Unempl. Retired Other* 
Age categories 
Age 50-54 0.343 0.485 0.066 0.409 0.313 0.442 0.049 0.146 
Age 55-57 0.257 0.303 0.084 0.258 0.263 0.169 0.116 0.292 
Age58-59 0.136 0.212 0.108 0.121 0.149 0.091 0.079 0.208 
Age 60-62 0.145 0.000 0.377 0.076 0.148 0.182 0.177 0.250 
Age 63-68 reference category reference category 
Job characteristics 
Self employed 0.094 0.061 0.108 0.212 0.302 0.169 0.165 0.208 
Occupational pension right 0.387 0.273 0.365 0.242 0.553 0.481 0.616 0.583 
Job in service sector 0.840 0.727 0.826 0.879 0.562 0.506 0.591 0.437 
Job with fixed term contract 0.060 0.091 0.150 0.258 0.082 0.130 0.146 0.021 
Job ten ure 10 years or more 0.398 0.212 0.443 0.333 0.416 0.351 0.512 0.521 
Highest educ. attainment 
Academic degree 0.130 0.000 0.138 0.061 0.140 0.065 0.140 0.042 
Vocational training reference category reference category 
No job qualification 0.596 0.758 0.569 0.667 0.565 0.558 0.591 0.604 
Demographies 
Serious health problems 0.038 0.061 0.054 0.121 0.023 0.026 0.067 0.292 
Partner is working 0.574 0.667 0.347 0.561 0.624 0.571 0.415 0.438 
Lives with Partner 0.777 0.818 0.713 0.879 0.886 0.857 0.848 0.896 
Part-time job 0.510 0.455 0.611 0.758 0.092 0.066 0.201 0.063 
* including family care and disabled 
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Table A2: Results of multinomial regression models, German sampie 
SampIe 11: onlyemployees (excluding workers in farming and forrestry and civil servants) 
Women Unemployed 
Coef. Std. Err. 
Age 50-54 -0.591 0.297 ** 
Age 55-57 0.203 0.277 
Age 58-59 - -
Age 60-62 - -
Job ten ure 10 years or more -0.337 0.229 
Job in a large firm 0.508 0.321 
Job in a small firm 0.617 0.285 ** 
Job in service sector -0.995 0.223 *** 
Disabled -0.336 0.476 
Academic degree -0.952 1.029 
No job qualification -0.426 0.231 * 
Not of German nationality 0.208 0.269 
Serious health problems 0.732 0.220 *** 
Partner is working -0.177 0.250 
Lives with Partner 0.247 0.289 
Part time job 0.038 0.243 
constant -2.921 0.461 *** 
Number of events 101 
= ,-1146.66 Log Likelihood 
Number of obs 
X2(30) 
= 3133 (676 individuals) 
= 443.56 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1621 
Men Unemployed 
Coef. Std. Err. 
Age 50-54 0.039 0.728 
Age 55-57 1.053 0.723 
Age 58-59 1.504 0.728 ** 
Age 60-62 1.541 0.733 ** 
Job tenure 10 years or more -0.365 0.162 ** 
Job in a large firm 0.454 0.166 *** 
Job in a small firm 0.187 0.163 
Job in service sector -0.853 0.179 *** 
Disabled 0.247 0.208 
Academic degree 0.041 0.259 
No job qualification 0.157 0.161 
Not of German nationality 0.148 0.156 
Serious health problems 0.357 0.155 ** 
Partner is working -0.059 0.138 
Lives with Partner 0.014 0.210 
constant -3.838 0.760 *** 
Number of events 269 
= -2098.86 Log Likelihood 
Number of obs 
X2(30) 
= 6374 (1242 individuals) 
= 856.06 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1694 
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Retired or other states 
Coef. Std. Err. 
-2.669 0.375 *** 
-2.496 0.378 *** 
-1.668 0.378 *** 
0.444 0.368 
0.115 0.175 
0.224 0.202 
0.081 0.182 
0.262 0.168 
0.702 0.225 *** 
-0.518 0.385 
0.275 0.157 * 
-0.186 0.207 
0.792 0.161 *** 
-0.321 0.168 * 
0.276 0.188 
,- 0.695 0.158 *** 
-1.559 0.452 *** 
275 
Retired or other states 
Coef. Std. Err. 
-4.500 0.233 *** 
-3.617 0.209 *** 
-2.650 0.204 *** 
-1.599 0.183 *** 
-0.236 0.167 
0.254 0.155 * 
-0.043 0.148 
-0.016 0.132 
1.222 0.155 *** 
-0.620 0.259 ** 
0.134 0.160 
-0.299 0.161 * 
0.976 0.136 *** 
-0.256 0.133 * 
0.256 0.207 
-0.165 0.293 
376 
Table A3: Results of multinomial regression models, British sampie 
S I II I I (I d' I . f' d t ) amp.e : Ollly empJ oyees 'exc u mg empJ oyees m armmgan orrestry~ 
Table A4: Women Unemployed 
Coef. Std. Err. 
Age 50-54 0.740 0.489 
Age 55-57 0.744 0.510 
Age 58-59 
Age 60-62 
Occupational pension right -0.838 0.427 ** 
Job with fixed term contract 0.404 0.758 
Part time job -0.341 0.396 
Academic degree 
Job in service sector -0.706 0.424 * 
Serious health problems 0.020 1.032 
Partner is working 0.597 0.562 
Lives with Partner -0.347 0.660 
constant -3.544 0.645 *** 
Number of events 31 
Log Likelihood 
Number of obs 
X2(33) 
= -765.945 
= 1809 (501 individuals) 
= 249.92 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1403 
Table A5: Men Unemployed 
Coef. Std. EIT. 
Age 50-54 0.523 0.434 
Age 55-57 -0.393 0.515 
Age 58-59 -0.220 0.565 
Age 60-62 0.403 0.481 
Occupational pension right -0.886 0.282 *** 
Job with fixed term contract 0.839 0.480 * 
Job tenure 10 years or more 0.150 0.284 
Academic degree -0.808 0.532 
Job in service sector -0.224 0.264 
Serious health problems -0.444 1.033 
Partner is working -0.135 0.301 
Lives with Partner -0.118 0.417 
constant -2.441 0.542 *** 
Number of events 63 
= -757.814 Log Likelihood 
Number of obs 
X2(36) 
= 1725 (523 individuals) 
= 305.22 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1676 
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Retired 
Coef. Std. EIT. 
-2.954 0.380 *** 
-2.404 0.337 *** 
-1.888 0.344 *** 
-0.209 0.226 
0.521 0.217 ** 
0.457 0.306 
-0.055 0.214 
0.472 0.284 * 
-0.237 0.258 
0.956 0.407 ** 
-0.427 0.223 * 
0.127 0.240 
-1.108 0.346 *** 
147 
Retired 
Coef. Std. EIT. 
-3.437 0.403 *** 
-2.525 0.314 *** 
-2.404 0.363 *** 
-1.412 0.266 *** 
0.537 0.247 ** 
1.038 0.360 *** 
0.508 0.214 ** 
0.198 0.283 
0.324 0.206 
2.011 0.410 *** 
-0.335 0.218 
-0.032 0.309 
-1.535 0.382 *** 
134 
Other states 
Coef. Std. EIT. 
0.906 0.512 * 
0.383 0.543 
-0.035 0.636 
-0.209 0.628 
0.222 0.344 
1.626 0.407 *** 
1.056 0.369 *** 
-2.156 1.039 ** 
0.499 0.541 
1.626 0.480 *** 
-0.778 0.337 ** 
1.261 0.498 ** 
-5.868 0.818 *** 
51 
Other states 
Coef. Std. EIT. 
-0.657 0.756 
0.058 0.699 
0.643 0.698 
0.328 0.716 
-0.111 0.414 
0.129 0.373 
0.103 0.368 
3.184 0.419 *** 
-0.701 0.374 * 
0.745 0.674 
-4.311 0.935 *** 
37 
